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A B S T R A C T   
This paper seeks to understand the conditions of possibility of “sanctuary” – the claiming of a “sacred” space of 
(humanitarian) exception - in the midst of civil war. Sanctuary codifies an exceptional space where sovereign and 
pastoral registers of power converge into a form of “pastoral sovereignty” that can temporarily “interrupt” the 
law of violence of sovereign power. In civil war this can enable civilians to be saved and protected from killings 
and suffering. However, this pastoral sovereignty is precarious as it depends on the belligerents’ good will and 
tacit authorization: this is what we call the predicament of pastoral sovereignty. Using the case study of Church 
sanctuary in Sri Lanka’s civil war, this paper explores how this predicament of pastoral sovereignty comes into 
effect in moments of acute crisis. Throughout Sri Lanka’s brutal civil war, Catholic priests provided “sanctuary” 
to Tamil civilians in the form of territorial sanctuary (Church compounds), bodily sanctuary (the priests’ bodies 
providing protection), and numerous other humanitarian activities. Our ethnographic material illustrates the 
force and fragility of the Church’s claims to pastoral sovereignty and its sanctuary practices and provides detailed 
accounts of numerous constellations. The paper thereby raises fundamental questions about the ontology of 
sovereignty and its operability in moments of humanitarian crisis.   
“I am afraid of laboratories, because in the laboratory you take the 
problems and then you bring them home to tame them, to paint them 
artificially, out of their context. You cannot bring home the frontier, 
but you have to live on the border and be audacious” (Pope Francis)1 
1. Introduction 
It’s late 2007 in Sri Lanka’s northern district of Mannar. The Sri 
Lankan army has launched a massive military offensive against the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) who are retreating across the 
area. Desperate for cadres, the LTTE aggressively recruits Tamil teenage 
boys in the territory under their control. In the middle of the war zone 
lies a famous Catholic shrine, Madhu. Families gather here in fear, 
mothers have brought sons into the church building to guard them 
against forced recruitment. The priests who are the guardians of the 
shrine, stand in front of the doors of the large Church. Angry LTTE 
cadres try to force entry but the priests refuse to let them pass. 
Confrontation ensues and the LTTE commander threatens to kill the 
priests, but they do not relent and eventually, the LTTE give up and 
withdraw. 
This period was the final phase of Sri Lanka’s civil war. For more 
than two decades the LTTE had fought for an independent Tamil Eelam 
against the Sri Lankan state. In late 2007, the military battle had esca-
lated in the north, where the LTTE had held a large territory under its 
control and had acted as “de facto sovereign” (Klem and Manuaguru 
2017). The LTTE, known as “the Tigers” had a reputation for their 
ruthlessness towards opponents, especially when their sovereignty was 
challenged. Locally they had killed many so-called “traitors” (Thir-
anagama 2010) or community leaders who opposed them (Goodhand 
et al., 2000; Klem and Maunaguru 2017, 2018; Thiranagama 2011). 
Furthermore, the Tigers were already known for violence at religious 
sites; they had thrown bombs into mosques in Kattankudy in 1990, 
killing more than 110 worshipping Muslims (Hasbullah and Korf 2013). 
They had repeatedly targeted and killed Buddhist monks and jailed and 
beaten Hindu priests, who they considered to be traitors (Sidharthan 
2020). The story at Madhu therefore raises the question: Why did the 
LTTE not simply shoot the priests and force entry to the Church? 
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It is the proposition of this paper that the Church embodied a form of 
“sovereignty” that the LTTE did not dare to challenge. The Church’s 
refutation to let the LTTE enter its Church territory puts forward a claim 
to an extra-territorial space within the sacred grounds of the Catholic 
Church, where it reserves the right to sole authority contra the LTTE’s 
sovereign claims. Exploring why, on this occasion, the LTTE did not 
shoot the priests, despite their resistance to the LTTE’s mission to recruit 
new fighters, therefore raises fundamental questions about the ontology 
of sovereign power (Agnew 2005; Barkan 2017; Jones 2009; Humphrey 
2007; McConnell 2013; Sidaway 2003) and its operability in moments of 
humanitarian crisis (Asad 2015; Fassin 2007; Keen 2014). Sovereignty is 
here understood as a “tentative and emergent form of authority” 
(Hansen and Stepputat 2006) that is not simply given, but needs to be 
constantly claimed, performed and secured through technologies of 
power, in its extreme form, through brute violence, as was the case in Sri 
Lanka’s civil war: sovereignty was heavily contested and fragmented 
across time and space and violence an everyday occurrence (De Alwis 
and Hyndman, 2004; Klem and Maunaguru 2017; Korf et al., 2010). 
The Church had repeatedly claimed that Madhu and other Catholic 
compounds were territories the army and rebels had no legitimacy to 
enter and declared the shrine and its vicinities as “sanctuary”, i.e. as a 
humanitarian space of guaranteed refuge outside of the realm of secular 
sovereign powers. The delineation of Church territory as “sanctuary” has 
a long history, both internationally and in Sri Lanka: for example, during 
the “feudal revolution” in Medieval Europe, when violent conflict be-
tween local princes and barons was endemic, Church sanctuary provided 
immunity to ordinary people in distress (Babo 2003, p. 101ff.; Kirby 
1982), which was deemed “irrevocable by the monarch” (Bau 1985, p. 
141). In modern times, several sanctuary movements have revamped 
this claim for humanitarian action, especially to provide protection for 
conscientious dissenters or Asylum seekers, who are given refuge on 
Church compounds (Marfleet 2011; Lippert 2004, 2006, Mitchell and 
MacFarlane, 2018). In Sri Lanka, Madhu shrine embodies a long tradi-
tion of sanctuary as a place of refuge, worship and relief assistance 
(Stirrat 1992, p. 32f.); and its sacredness is acknowledged not only by 
Christians, but Buddhists, Hindus, even Muslims alike (Hansen 2003, 
3ff.). 
This claim to sanctuary as an extra-territorial space is fundamentally 
a claim to sovereignty, albeit one that is not enforced by violence, but 
“honoured on moral, religious and other grounds” (Hansen, 2003, p. 3). 
Claiming sanctuary as a “sacred” space of exception, thereby un-
derwrites the transgression of pastoral registers of power - “a power of 
care [of the shepherd who] looks after the flock” (Foucault 2007, p. 127) 
- into sovereign registers, and through this operation constitutes what 
we call “pastoral sovereignty”. Carl Schmitt famously declared that the 
sovereign is “he who decides on a state of exception” (Schmitt, 1922, 
13). Pastoral sovereignty deploys a “language of a political theology” at 
odds with Schmitt’s, resonating instead with Johann-Baptist Metz’s 
definition of a new political theology (Metz 1977, p. 150; Metz, 1997): 
The state of exception that pastoral sovereignty declares in the 
extra-territorial space of the sanctuary interrupts the “law” of sovereign 
violence on humanitarian grounds. 
And yet, pastoral sovereignty is irreducibly temporary and precari-
ous: In moments of violent excess, the non-violent claim of sanctuary 
leaves pastoral sovereignty vulnerable to moments of indiscriminate 
killing. A shocking event at the Cathedral of Batticaloa town in eastern 
Sri Lanka illustrates this precariousness: In 2005, Joseph Para-
rajasingham, a veteran Tamil MP from Batticaloa, was killed inside the 
Cathedral during Christmas mass by two gunmen who shot him when he 
was returning to his pew after receiving the communion from Bishop 
Kingsley Swampillai (Spencer et al., 2015, 116). The killing took place 
when the LTTE had split up in eastern Sri Lanka. The theatrical act of 
killing was widely understood to be a message from an anti-LTTE Tamil 
militant group to warn LTTE supporters that no space would be safe for 
them, not even the sacred space of the Cathedral, not even in its most 
“sacred” moment of the holy communion. 
The predicament of pastoral sovereignty therefore raises the 
following question: what makes sanctuary claims and practice credible 
and robust in certain circumstances and when do those claims fail or 
disintegrate? To interrogate this question, this paper scrutinizes 
different sites and practices through which the “Tamil” Church, its 
priests, nuns and a prominent bishop, provided sanctuary to civilians 
suffering in the war and performed pastoral sovereignty: 1) the invio-
lability of sanctuary territories of Church compounds; 2) the sovereign 
bodies of their priests and nuns who were given free passage across 
military frontlines; and finally, 3) the charismatic authority of the 
bishop of Mannar diocese. 
The field work on which these insights build have been compiled 
from several studies conducted by the two authors in Sri Lanka’s former 
war zones. Johnson conducted 154 interviews, including many over 
repeated field work periods in Sri Lanka (April 2010, November–De-
cember 2010, October 2011, April 2013 (London), January–February 
2014), including with priests, the Bishop of Mannar, local aid workers, 
civil society representatives and other key informants. Korf interviewed 
selected priests from Mannar at a later stage (in 2017) and other Cath-
olic lay people and clergy on numerous occasions. In addition, Korf 
interviewed priests, aid workers and civil society representatives in 
Batticaloa and drew on interviews and material collected as part of a 
collaborative ethnography of war and peace in eastern Sri Lanka con-
ducted from 2007 to 2008 (Goodhand et al., 2009, Spencer et al., 2015). 
A third source for our case comes from interviews with Catholic nuns in 
Mannar and Vavuniya, conducted by master’s student Chiara Borner in 
October to December 2016 (Borner 2017). Our material thereby com-
bines a dense ethnography of Madhu shrine and the work of priests in 
the diocese of Mannar, as well as more scattered information about 
priestly practices in other places of the former warzones of Sri Lanka.2 
2. Catholicism and Sri Lanka’s separatist conflict 
The Catholic Church in Sri Lanka represents a religious minority 
within Sinhalese and Tamil populations, thus finds itself in the middle of 
multiple struggles over identification, purification and boundary work 
(Nissan 2018; Stirrat 1992). In the broader identity politics of the island, 
“ethnicity” and “religion” as identity markers sometimes overlap, 
sometimes diverge: Tamils can be Christian or Hindu, and Christians can 
be Sinhalese or Tamil. Moreover, ethno-nationalism holds an uneasy 
relationship with “religion”: Sinhalese nationalists explicitly conflate a 
“Sinhala-Buddhist” identity to articulate their claims (Obeyesekara 
1979; Rambukwella 2018; Seneviratne 1999; Tambiah 1992; Venugopal 
2018), while Tamil separatist and ethno-nationalist discourse tends to 
steer clear of “religion” altogether (Thangarajah, 2000). While some 
Tamil Tigers were Catholic, most were Hindus, and the movement 
defined itself as secular. In the 1990’s an LTTE cadre explained to Pat-
ricia Lawrence that “religion is not part of the ‘consciousness of the 
struggle’” (Lawrence, 1997, 40). And yet, importantly there were 
Catholics in the military line of command of both the Sri Lankan armed 
forces and the LTTE. 
With increasing ethnic polarization during and after the war, the 
2 As most priests were accustomed to speak out as public intellectuals, most 
of them were open and frank about their work, the LTTE, the Sri Lankan army 
and human rights violations. Some spoke of internal struggles within the 
Church. As much of this material is politically sensitive, we apply caution in quoting 
directly from this material for ethical reasons. We have annonymized all sources, 
where appropriate. All interviews were conducted in English. We have coded all 
interviews as follows: Interviewer_category of interviewed person_location 
(region) of interview_date of interview. If more than one person of the same 
category were interviewed on the same day, these are given numbers, e.g. B_ 
Priest 2_Batticaloa_020717 = Interview conducted by B of a priest (the second 
on that day) in Batticaloa on 2 July 2017. Interviewers: B = Benedikt Korf; D =
Deborah Johnson. 
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Church has become bitterly divided along ethnic lines, making observers 
speak of a “Sinhala” and a “Tamil” Church in Sri Lanka. In the 1990’s 
Stirrat reported that the “Sinhala” Church hierarchy had disengaged 
from politics (Stirrat 1992, p. 45). The same could not be said about the 
“Tamil” Church hierarchy (Brown 2015, p. 598). For example, during 
the war and in the years following the military defeat of the LTTE, 
Mannar’s Tamil Bishop Rayappu Joseph, became one of the few and 
most vocal advocates for Tamil rights. Although the Tamil clergy and 
Bishop Joseph were popular and respected among the (Catholic, Chris-
tian and Hindu) Tamil population, they were criticised by Sinhalese 
nationalists, who considered them as “white tigers”, alluding to the 
white garment of the priests to suggest that they were LTTE supporters 
(Johnson 2016, p. 315ff.). On the other hand, Sinhalese Church leaders 
had worked to maintain good relations with the “Sinhalese camp” and 
the government. Cardinal Malcolm Ranjith of Colombo was publicly 
loyal to then President Mahinda Rajapakse, a relationship facilitated by 
Rajapakse’s Catholic wife. Tamil priests therefore often expressed frus-
tration about a lack of support from the Sinhalese Church hierarchy for 
their humanitarian and human rights work.3 
Throughout Sri Lanka’s war zones, Tamil priests and nuns travelled 
to remote, insecure places, crossed military frontlines, provided safe 
grounds on Church compounds to refugees, brought relief items to ci-
vilians trapped in LTTE controlled areas or lost between the frontlines 
and recorded human rights abuses of both conflict parties (Brown 2015; 
Goodhand et al., 2009; Johnson 2012, 2016, Spencer at al. 2015). Priests 
who chose to engage in this kind of humanitarian work took great 
personal risks. Numerous Tamil priests publicly denounced human 
rights abuses by the Sri Lankan military forces against Tamil civilians, 
most notably Mannar’s Bishop Rayappu Joseph. A small group of Tamil 
priests also dared to speak out courageously against LTTE atrocities, for 
example child recruitment (Brown 2015). Many of those who stood up 
were Jesuits, and a significant number of them declared that their 
spiritual inspiration came from Vatican II and Liberation Theology 
(Spencer et al., 2015, 8, 35, 127f.).4 
3. Questions of sovereignty, sanctuary and political theology 
The protection afforded by Catholic “sanctuary” in Sri Lanka’s war 
zone raises fundamental questions about the ontology of sovereignty, 
and political theology. In this respect, Foucault famously distinguished 
the logics of two incompatible laws of power: sovereign and pastoral 
power. Sovereign power is a menacing power able to kill or to refrain 
from killing (Foucault, 1978, p. 135f). Foucault claims the sovereign’s 
ultimate reference point is the sword (Ojakangas 2005, p. 6); when 
challengers transgress the sovereign’s claim they are met with the ab-
solute menace of death – or in war: with military force or spectacular 
violence, e.g. against internal enemies and traitors (Agamben 1998; 
Hansen and Stepputat 2006; Thiranagama 2010). Pastoral power is the 
opposite of violence (Ojakangas 2005, p. 20). Foucault describes it as “a 
power of care. It looks after the flock … The shepherd is someone who 
keeps watch” (Foucault 2007, p. 127). The shepherd or pastor must be 
prepared to sacrifice himself in order to save his sheep (Foucault 2007, 
p. 170,; Golder 2007). 
Pastoral sovereignty combines these two registers of power in its 
claim to sanctuary (Lippert 2004): Sanctuary codifies “an exceptional 
space and a set of practices” (Lippert 2006, p. 74) in which and through 
which the shepherd’s (potential) intervening sacrifice on behalf of the 
flock signals a “higher” (sacred) law “consistent with the exercise of a 
sovereign power that flows from Church and community” (Lippert 2006, 
p. 73f.). The potential sacrifice of the shepherd on behalf of the flock 
provides the grounds for a different kind of sovereign power that is 
exercised to protect from killing and suffering. The shepherd’s potential 
sacrifice thereby produces a “moral untouchability” (Fassin 2013), 
which transforms a seeming weakness (the lack of means of violence) 
into a formidable power (Eagleton 2018). 
When the priests at Madhu shrine barricaded the doors to protect 
civilians from LTTE recruitment their sanctuary claims were under-
written by a (potential) intervening sacrifice (being shot by LTTE 
cadres). Through this potentially sacrificial act on behalf of the com-
munity, the priests effectively claimed a space of exception – an alter-
native sovereign space based on the moral force of their pastoral power. 
In this moment, religion is mobilized as an “interruption” (Metz 1977, p. 
150) of secular sovereignty in the name of love, solidarity and sacrifice. If 
the sovereign is “he who decides on a state of exception” (Schmitt, 
1922/1985, p. 5), the Church’s delineation of “sanctuary” as a space of 
exception, where it claims “sole” authority, has sovereign connotations 
with performative effects: The LTTE did not dare to transgress it. 
This claim to pastoral sovereignty over a specific territory outside of 
(territorially) and beyond (institutionally) the sovereign claims of the Sri 
Lankan government and the LTTE operated in a “highly confused po-
litical landscape of competing sovereign claims” (Klem and Manuaguru 
2017, 640), characterized by an excess of sovereign violence that “is 
performed and designed to generate loyalty, fear, and legitimacy” 
(Hansen and Stepputat 2006, p. 297). A multitude of (state and 
non-state) “petty sovereigns” operated in this shadowy, fragmented field 
of sovereignty. Petty sovereigns, writes Judith Butler, reign “by aims and 
tactics of power they do not inaugurate or fully control. And yet such 
figures are delegated with the power to render unilateral decisions, 
accountable to no law and without any legitimate authority” (Butler 
2004, p. 56). These petty sovereigns invent their own rule, enforced 
through violence and coercion without a sanctioned state authority 
calling them to order. 
In Sri Lanka’s war zone, sovereignty was heavily contested, fractured 
and fragmented across time and space (Hyndman and De Alwis, 2004; 
Bohle 2007; Klem and Maunaguru 2017, 2018; Korf et al., 2010; 
McGilvray, 2008; Sarvananthan, 2007; Stokke 2006; Walker 2013). The 
major belligerents, and many smaller militant groups, claimed totalizing 
sovereignty (even if in a small territory), instilling in them the urge to 
unleash violence to achieve their aspiration (Hansen & Stepputat, 2005, 
22–32; Maunaguru 2020). The LTTE in particular “arrogated itself the 
right to govern all Tamil life and death … [and] the lives and deaths of 
traitors and martyrs were sacrificeable without retribution” (Thir-
anagama 2011, pp. 215, 217). The Sri Lankan military and secret ser-
vices operated in a state of emergency that gave them a significant space 
of discretionary powers to kill or punish with impunity. In the shadow of 
these major combatant parties, numerous “petty” sovereigns exercised 
“de facto” sovereign power, including Tamil militants operating with the 
tacit complicity of the military or “rogue” elements within the rank and 
files of army, LTTE or other Tamil militant groups, producing a check-
erboard of terror, violence and fear (Gaasbeek 2010; Klem; Manuaguru, 
2018; Korf 2013; Spencer et al., 2015; Walker 2013). 
In this landscape of competing sovereignties, international humani-
tarian organisations, such as the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) emerged as “new circles of power”, which offered “new 
meanings to the concept of sovereignty” (Wickremasinghe 2001, p. 
159). Through a politics of life (Fassin 2007), that offers people at risk 
the assistance that allows them to survive, humanitarian organisations 
3 Sinhalese clergy we interviewed have argued that Tamil clergy often fail to 
recognize the perilous position they inhabit, living amidst a Buddhist majority, 
and sitting alongside political power in Colombo. In such a position, they argue, 
they have worked hard to maintain political and social relations, not only to 
protect Sinhalese Catholics from attacks by Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists but to 
keep open the diplomatic channels that have enabled the organization and 
transfer of vast aid resources to pass to Tamil clergy for distribution. Though 
they have not engaged in political support of the Tamil Church, or directly 
addressed the conflict they have in other ways ensured the survival of the 
Church in a perilous period (e.g. D_priest1_Mannar_071210, D_priest2_Mannar_ 
071210, D_priest_Colombo_250114).  
4 B_priest2_ 280717. 
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establish competing forms of sovereignty (Pandolfi 2003). These 
become effective in the spatial form of extra-territorial aid corridors and 
camps, set apart as nonbelligerent zones within the combat zone. The 
strength of their claims to extra-territorial sovereignty is grounded in the 
transnational moral appeal of “crisis” and “suffering” codified in hu-
manitarian law that backs up their legitimacy and operational capacities 
as international agencies, operating inside and outside the secular logic 
of sovereignty. 
The Church’s claim to pastoral sovereignty appeals to humanitari-
anism in its claim to protect bodies from violence, but it operates in the 
register of political theology: It confronts and disrupts petty sovereigns’ 
claim to de facto sovereign power temporarily, based on the “sacred” 
exception of its extra-territorial claim.5 This claim to pastoral sovereignty 
is predicated on the Catholic Church in Sri Lanka being both a local and 
a transnational organization. During the colonial era, (missionary) 
priests enjoyed respect and power that the colonial administrators 
“frequently envied” (Stirrat 1992, p. 17). Although the Church lost most 
of its privilege and power it had held under colonial administration in 
the decades after independence, some have survived the colonial era and 
the indigenization of the priesthood, e.g. tax exemptions (although these 
are granted for other religions as well). Brown (2015, 598f.) further 
indicates that the “Tamil” Church – and the remaining foreign mis-
sionaries in eastern Sri Lanka (e.g. American Jesuits in Batticaloa) - 
continued to enjoy respect among Tamils as advocates of Tamil minority 
rights. Pastoral sovereignty is predicated on this legacy of the Church’s 
extra-territorial power beyond the state. 
“Territory is made … through bodies” write Smith et al. (2016, 259; 
see also: Hyndman and De Alwis, 2004; Fluri 2011). The pastoral sov-
ereign acts as shepherd to protect the flock from de facto sovereigns’ 
imposition of violence over their bodies. The bodies of priests and nuns 
subverted sovereign practices of territorial control by claiming sanctu-
ary, by moving their own bodies across borders and military frontlines. 
By moving with vulnerable people, bodies provide sanctuary protection 
(Koopman 2011). In Sri Lanka’s war zone, the pastoral bodies of priests 
were highly visible and effective in their white garment, their habits, 
which could be seen from afar and placed priests apart even in large 
crowds of people: “Priests would go in front and be visible, civilians 
would follow behind feeling protected”.6 This untouchability of a 
certain kind of body mirrors activist strategies of international accom-
paniers in Colombia, whose “alter-geopolitics” of “putting bodies 
together” Sara Koopman (2011) has described as an activist tactic “to 
build alternative non-violent securities”. 
These protective bodies become an important site of sovereign power 
that displays an “aura” and “charisma” that warrants respect. In medi-
eval political theology, according to Ernst Kantorowicz’s classic study 
(Kantorowicz, 1957), the King was understood to have two bodies, a 
natural and a political one. Similarly, the priest (or bishop) has two 
bodies of a pastoral sovereign: his natural body as vulnerable human 
being and the (sacred) body of the pastoral sovereign that the priest is 
Figure 1. Map of Mannar District (Sri Lanka)  
5 “Below the radar” of sovereign powers, numerous religious healing rituals 
and practices have been performed in Churches and Temples (Hatsumi 2017; 
Lawrence, 1996; Maunaguru 2020; Walker 2013), which complement the 
politically more exposed humanitarian work of the Church. The strength of 
pastoral power of the Church emerges from this combination of intimate reli-
gious rituals, the practice of liturgy and humanitarianism, which makes its 
performances of pastoral sovereignty credible and forceful: The priest fulfils his 
duty (as shepherd), and through action, the priest becomes what he is 
(Agamben 2013, p. 87), a pastoral sovereign. 6 D_LayHindu_Mannar_26012014. 
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willing to sacrifice on behalf of the flock. Aura compounds charisma in a 
king’s crown or a priest’s robe (Jaeger 2011, p. 24). For Walter 
Benjamin, “aura” produces unapproachability (Unnahbarkeit) as “a 
unique apparition of a distance” (Benjamin, 1968/2007, 243). Such aura 
is a ghostly quality of things, places or persons that is sensed, not seen 
(Jaeger 2011, p. 21f.,; Hansen 2008), whereas “charisma” as “a certain 
quality of an individual” produces – according to Max Weber’s famous 
definition - a particular form of authority. It is this aura of the “un-
touchable” priestly body that makes sanctuary authoritative as a per-
formance of pastoral sovereignty. 
Not all religions, scared sites and bodes displayed this “untouch-
ability”. Indeed, their sacredness was often ignored by the belligerents in 
Sri Lanka’s war, sometimes even explicitly targeted. For example, the 
famous Thirukeetheeswaram Hindu temple close to Madhu Church in 
Mannar district was occupied by the army as a “high security zone”, 
despite calls for it to also be respected as a “sacred space.” In 1990, the 
LTTE attacked two mosques in Kattankudy, killing approx. 140 wor-
shippers (Hasbullah and Korf 2013). In 1995, the Sri Lankan Air Force 
dropped a bomb on St Peter’s Church in Navali, Jaffna, killing 65 people. 
In January 1998, LTTE suicide bombers attacked the Temple of Tooth at 
Kandy, killing thirteen persons. In August 2007, government bombs fell 
on St Philipp Neri’s Church at Allaipiddy in Jaffna, killing 15 people who 
had sought shelter in the Church. Hindu priests are reported to have 
been imprisoned and beaten up by the LTTE (Sidharthan 2020). Even 
more so, the question arises, why Catholic sites and bodies were un-
touchable in certain constellations. 
4. Sanctuary as territory 
Church compounds were often territories of sanctuary: Numerous 
informants, both from inside and outside the Church gave us examples of 
civilians fleeing to Church compounds for protection during times of 
crisis and military escalation.7 Madhu shrine in Mannar district was not 
the only, but probably the most prominent of these Church sanctuaries 
in Sri Lanka’s war. Madhu sanctuary houses a statue of the Virgin Mary 
and is a sacred Catholic site (Stirrat 1992, pp. 26, 32). Catholics claim it 
first provided their community sanctuary in 1544 when they fled from a 
massacring Hindu king (Hansen 2003; Hyndman 2003; Perrera 1998). 
The 400-acre site lies 12 miles off the main road between Mannar and 
Vavuniya, which was heavily militarized and often functioned as a 
military frontline. For most of the conflict Madhu was in LTTE territory 
(“uncleared” areas, or “the Vanni”), but when fighting escalated it 
became frontline territory. 
On April 1, 2008, Bishop Joseph of Mannar issued a public statement 
to the Sri Lankan media, in which he defended Madhu Shrine as, 
“a place of religious worship and a place of refuge for displaced 
people … kept strictly out of bounds of any type of military or po-
litical activity … a zone of peace completely and solely under the 
administration of the Church” (our emphasis).8 
In this statement, the bishop makes a claim to pastoral sovereignty, 
because he precludes the sovereign right of other authorities to intervene 
by appealing to pastoral logics of worship and refuge. Premised on the 
sacredness of the place, the bishop declares Madhu shrine as a human-
itarian sanctuary. 
The Church had begun to administer Madhu shrine as a humanitar-
ian shelter early in the conflict and had established consensus among 
warring factions that it was to be a safe space and demilitarized zone 
(Hyndman 2003, p. 179). In November 1990, the United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) partnered with the Church to 
establish an Open Relief Center (ORC) at Madhu, then within LTTE 
territory, to offer displaced people essential relief such as food, water 
and sanitation. Together, the Church and major international humani-
tarian aid organisations installed a huge refugee camp in the vicinities of 
the shrine (Hyndman 2003). Until April 2008, when the Sri Lankan army 
finally conquered the area from the LTTE, the shrine hosted tens of 
thousands of IDPs for months at a time. 
Open Relief Centres (ORC) were declared as politically neutral 
“zones of peace”, banning weapons and uniforms. These ORCs were 
established with the agreement of the LTTE and the government 
(Wickremasinghe 2001, p. 156). Early on after its establishment at 
Madhu, the Church and UNHCR secured LTTE agreement not to recruit 
or raise tax on the site (Hansen 2003, p. 10; Hyndman 2003). The close 
collaboration of UNHCR and the clergy made Madhu sanctuary a rela-
tively safe space from interference by combatants compared to other 
ORC camps. On numerous occasions, Madhu clergy, sometimes in 
collaboration with UNHCR officers, intervened with the LTTE to 
convince them not to enter the sanctuary armed or in uniform and to 
stop child recruitment on the premises. Hansen (2003, 11) reports that 
this intervention with the LTTE could be delicate. The LTTE resented the 
neutral status of the sanctuary and saw those taking shelter in the 
compound as escaping their duty to join the liberation struggle. And yet, 
the LTTE “almost always” complied with these requests, as they had “too 
much to lose” by alienating or openly opposing the clergy, and especially 
the Bishop of Mannar (Hansen 2003, p. 11) who were held in extremely 
high regard among Catholic (and non-Catholic) Tamils. 
However, when military battles pressured combatants they could 
become more aggressive. In such crisis moments, the attempt to place 
this site outside of the space of military confrontation and to claim the 
sanctuary as territory under the pastoral sovereignty of the Church 
would falter or become fragile. Two such crisis moments happened in 
November 1999 and in March 2008, and these illustrate the predicament 
of pastoral sovereignty. 
A fierce round of fighting in March 1999 saw a major government 
offensive against the LTTE target areas around Madhu. The military 
campaign coincided with national elections and the incumbent Presi-
dent Chandrika Kumaratunga Bandaranaike promised to “liberate” 
Madhu. Although fighting initially detoured around the shrine, the army 
eventually violated the “no guns, no uniforms” policy and soldiers 
entered sanctuary grounds. 30,000 refugees who were sheltering at the 
ORC were relocated to government camps and the shelters 
disassembled. 
It was a few months until the LTTE was ready to counter-attack, but 
in November they succeeded in driving the Sri Lankan army back from 
most of the territory the latter had taken. Refugees sheltering at Pal-
ampaddy found themselves again at a military frontline, and on the 18th 
November the UNHCR secured agreement from the LTTE to move 3500 
people back to Madhu, seen as a safer location. Just six days later six 
explosive rounds landed on and around Madhu Church and heavy 
fighting broke out in the area killing 38 civilians and wounding many 
more, including children (Hansen 2003). 
The situation was chaotic and bodies lay around the shrine but local 
delegations struggled to gain access to the area. Interviewees described 
to us that Bishop Joseph was granted access by both the LTTE and Sri 
Lankan army to cross military frontlines to reclaim the bodies. He 
entered Madhu site at 2am on the 21st November and dead bodies were 
hastily wrapped in UNHCR sleeping mats and brought back to Mannar 
town, which was under curfew. The Bishop was reported to have spoken 
on the phone with President Chandrika. Furious at the violation of the 
declared “neutral zone” he threatened to personally drive the dead 
bodies to Colombo to protest publicly against the violation of Madhu’s 
sacredness by the army. Shortly after the army did withdraw from the 
sanctuary, and it was re-established as a humanitarian space with the 
UNHCR able to cross front lines to deliver food and shelter to the IDPs 
7 e.g. D_LayHindu_Mannar_07122010, D_priest1_Mannar_09122010, D_ 
priest2, Mannar_09122010, D_priest1_Mannar_31012014, D_nun1_Mannar_ 
31012014.  
8 J. Most Rev. Dr. Rayappu, Bishop of Mannar, Appeal to Protect the Shrine of 
Our Lady of Madhu from all Military Presence and Operations. Press Release. 
01.04.2008. 
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who took refuge at Madhu.9 
In late 2007, amidst a large-scale offensive by the Sri Lankan army, 
the LTTE became more and more brutal in recruiting cadres among 
young, unmarried men and youth. Child recruitment had been a con-
stant issue between Clergy and LTTE. The Bishop of Mannar remem-
bered an earlier occasion where an LTTE commander blustered at him, 
but he felt secure that the LTTE hierarchy would not consent with the 
latter’s behavior (Hansen 2003, p. 11). But during major battles, it 
became more difficult for priests to ensure compliance with the rules of 
the sanctuary. In late 2007, LTTE cadres increasingly entered the camps 
around Madhu to forcibly recruit young men to fight. There was 
frequent panic in the camp when LTTE cadres sought to round up 
teenagers to take them to fight with them. One of the senior priests 
remembered that at one such occasion, youth and parents assembled 
inside Madhu Church with priests standing at each door to prevent the 
LTTE from entering the Church, so that from any direction LTTE cadres 
would have to force their way past a priest to enter the group. The 
confrontations were heated. The LTTE commanders threatened to kill 
every priest unless they were let through, but the clergy did not relent, 
and eventually the LTTE retreated.10 
And yet, the protection that the priests could afford was precarious: 
while the LTTE did not dare to confront the priests on the spot and left 
the scene, their cadres would return later to the compound and catch 
some youth to join them after they had returned home, or after they had 
fled into the jungle, as the fighting neared Madhu. The priests had been 
able to counter the LTTE in the direct confrontation, but lacked the 
capacity to provide protection beyond the Church building itself. 
Furthermore, while the LTTE cadres did not touch the priests in the 
direct face-to-face confrontation, they tried to kill some priests remotely 
and clandestinely: one of the priests working at Madhu shrine was killed 
by a Claymore anti-personnel mine soon afterwards.11 
In the final phase of the war in the area in April 2008, the clergy were 
unable to uphold the sanctuary at Madhu shrine, because the two 
combatant parties tried to exploit the sacred shrine for their war pro-
paganda. By April 2008, all refugees had fled Madhu and finally, all the 
remaining priests vacated the site as well because the LTTE were trying 
to provoke the Sri Lankan army to shell Madhu sanctuary. On April 3, 
the remaining 13 priests fled from Madhu in a brief combat lull and took 
with them all church records and the sacred statues to Thevanpiddy 
Church, then in territory under LTTE control. Sinhala language media 
channels subsequently accused the Church of complicity with the Ti-
gers,12 but a priest who was among those who had to flee from Madhu 
explained that there had been no possibility to bring it elsewhere: they 
brought the statue to Thevanpiddy to avoid having to cross the military 
front lines in this heavily contested period.13 In August 2008, the priests 
returned the statue to Madhu when the Sri Lankan army had secured full 
control of the area. 
On August 15, 2009, Cardinal Malcolm Ranjith from Colombo, a 
close ally of President Rajapakse, celebrated the annual Madhu feast, 
attracting hundreds of thousands of worshippers, many of whom were 
Sinhalese who were celebrating Madhu’s “liberation”14 by the military, 
causing dissent within the Church15: Bishop Joseph did not attend these 
celebrations, presumably due to ill-health, and a number of priests 
stayed away from the celebrations in solidarity with the displaced 
people, priests and nuns in the camps. Ruki Fernando, a Sinhalese 
Catholic activist, who had often travelled to Madhu for his human rights 
work, expressed these feelings: 
How can we celebrate the Madhu feast? When so many of our people 
have been killed, injured, maimed, and forced to live in inhumane 
conditions, held captive against their will without any charges, and 
not allowed to go back to their families, villages, including those 
around Madhu shrine? When 6 Tamil Catholic priests continue to be 
detained, without any charges, perhaps for the crime of opting to 
stay back and serve their flock at the height of the war, in extremely 
difficult and dangerous circumstances?” (R. Fernando 2009) 
These celebrations of the “liberation” of Madhu illustrate the pre-
dicament of pastoral sovereignty: neither had the clergy been able to 
prevent the incursion of violence into Madhu’s premises, nor its political 
instrumentalization by Sinhala nationalists celebrating the military 
victory. The Church’s claim to sanctuary had been effective as long as 
the belligerents were held in check by the dynamics of the war: In those 
periods, de facto sovereigns were reluctant to challenge the Church’s 
claim to sanctuary, and if they did, the Church could mobilize its 
reputational resources to force a re-establishment of sanctuary. How-
ever, when the law of indiscriminate violence of military combat gained 
the upper hand, when neither LTTE nor the government cared to respect 
international opinion (as was the case in the final battle over the Vanni 
and in the aftermath of the government’s victory), the Church’s power to 
protect its sanctuary faltered. 
5. Sanctuary as embodied practice 
The Church was active in numerous sites across the war zone, as were 
numerous humanitarian aid organisations, which all operated in chal-
lenging circumstances (Bastian 1997; Korf 2006; Orjuela 2008; Walton 
2008; Wickremasinghe 2001). However, we were told numerous times: 
None developed the visibility and powers that Catholic clergy were 
recognized for, not even international ones: “where the ICRC could not 
go, priests were able to go”.16 This statement cannot be overestimated: if 
there was any humanitarian organization that could go (almost) any-
where in the Sri Lankan war zone, it would be the “ICRC” – the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross. This had to do with its mandate 
and its robust relations to both conflict parties, as well as its interna-
tional reputation. What gave priests (and to some extent nuns) the 
powers “to go where even the ICRC could not go”? 
Indeed, priests were crossing frontlines, entering camps, meeting 
high military and LTTE officials in particularly precarious moments of 
the conflict. During most of the war years, the landscape of northern and 
eastern Sri Lanka was scattered with checkpoints, formal borders and 
informal grey zones that made travelling across those lines difficult in 
everyday life (Gaasbeek 2010; Goodhand et al., 2009, 2000; Hyndman 
and de Alwis, 2004; Jeganathan 2004; Korf 2013; Korf et al., 2010; 
Walker 2013). During intense fighting, crossing the borders or frontlines 
became an impossibility for most civilians. Checkpoints and frontlines 
also inhibited the work of many aid agencies, then unable to deliver 
relief items to needy populations trapped between the lines. Priests, 
however, were often able to gain privileged access to military and LTTE 
commanders (Spencer et al., 2015, 123), which enabled them to nego-
tiate access to disputed areas or to receive a pass to cross checkpoints. 
The bodies of clergy embodied a kind of aura that provided sanctuary: 
being accompanied or being in the close company of a priest or a nun 
could provide some protection from being harassed by combatants. Lay 
civilians often sought this company as an explicit tactic to protect 
themselves. This form of sanctuary as embodied practice was described 
to us in an interview with a well-known (lay Sinhala) Catholic human 
9 D_layHindu_Mannar_26012014, D_NGO_Mannar_27012014, D_priest3_ 
Mannar_29012014.  
10 B_Priest1_Mannar_270717, D_Priest1_Mannar_270114.  
11 B_priest1_Mannar_270717.  
12 https://www.bbc.com/sinhala/news/story/2008/04/080421_madhu_bish 
op.shtml.  
13 D_priest2_Mannar_290114.  
14 D_NGO_Colombo_24012014, D_priest3_Mannar_29012014.  
15 https://www.bbc.com/sinhala/news/story/2009/08/090817_madhu_idps. 
shtml. 16 D_priest2_Mannar_290114. 
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rights activist. When travelling to the northern regions, he would seek 
the company of Catholic sisters, officially as interpreters, but effectively 
as “body guards”,17 helping him to cross checkpoints and travel safely 
through a landscape full of combatants and police surveillance from 
both combatant parties. Similarly, Ben Bavinck, a protestant missionary, 
writes in his diaries that when detained at a checkpoint, he recalls the 
“assumption” that they would be safe, because of the clerical robes of the 
Catholic priest amongst them.18 
Priests and nuns worked with and through Sri Lanka’s CARITAS 
organization EHED or SEDEC. They often became the hands and voices 
of EHED or SEDEC as they worked to distribute aid and travelled to 
dangerous areas. In Batticaloa, during the 1990s, EHED was permitted to 
bring items into LTTE-held areas, which were banned for other aid 
agencies, such as concrete (Spencer et al., 2015, 124). During intense 
battles towards the end of the war on the eastern front in Batticaloa in 
late 2006 and early 2007, priests continued to travel across the front-
lines to bring relief items and check the situation of civilians trapped in 
the combat zone, when the army forced the LTTE to retreat and thou-
sands of Tamil civilians fled from the former LTTE-held area.19 During 
the final battle in the Vanni, when all foreign aid agencies and local 
NGOs were expelled, the Catholic aid agency Caritas (SEDEC) was 
granted access to IDP camps to provide relief items, and some clergy 
stayed in those spaces with civilians20 “Until the final days of the 
fighting, there were seven priests remaining with the people, living in 
IDP centres. Through CARITAS they were able to organize relief and also 
spiritual events inside the camps”.21 
The presence of priests and nuns among civilians suffering in the war 
and the pastoral duties that they continued to carry out even in 
dangerous situations was often reported and lauded with respect: “They 
stayed with the suffering until the last moment, unless they were 
removed by force. If they were released from camps they worked to get 
others out”.22 In the final days of the war in the Vanni, seven priests and 
several nuns were trapped with approximately 300,000 civilians on 
Nandikadal Lagoon’s beaches (Harrisson 2012). Clergy could have 
secured a place on the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) 
evacuations, but most chose to stay. Equipped with satellite phones, 
some priests could communicate with the Church hierarchy about the 
humanitarian situation (Weiss 2011, p. 134). They were fulfilling pas-
toral duties, holding mass, praying with civilians and sharing in the 
suffering of the civilians (Harrisson 2012). 
On numerous occasions, priests negotiated access to or release from 
camps. For example, during the final months of battle in the Vanni, a 
priest was displaced alongside with a group of orphans under his care 
together with a nun. They were all detained in a camp, but he could 
negotiate his release from the camp. From outside the camp, he worked 
through Church networks to receive permission for the orphans and the 
nun to be released from the camp as well.23 In another circumstance, a 
local priest intervened on behalf of his congregation whose fishing 
livelihoods were threatened, when the army took control of the beaches. 
After long negotiations with the local military commander and his 
Colombo based superiors, the fishermen were again allowed access to 
the beach to follow their fishing practice.24 But there were also limits to 
these negotiations. One priest confided to us25 that when he was sta-
tioned in a remote parish, he noticed illicit trade and smuggling activ-
ities that negatively affected his parish flock. However, when he tried to 
intervene he received death threats and the bishop had to transfer him 
back into a post in Mannar town to protect his life. 
Their role as shepherds of the Tamil flock brought priests into an 
uneasy relation with the LTTE and the latter’s claim to speak and fight 
for the Tamil community. Most Tamil clergy were sympathetic to the 
struggle of Tamils for more recognition.26 The Church as institution 
never publicly challenged LTTE violence, albeit individual priests 
vehemently opposed the LTTE. The American missionary Father Harry 
Miller in Batticaloa, for example, repeatedly denounced the LTTE for 
recruiting children (Brown 2015, p. 598). Bishop Joseph publicly 
distanced himself from the LTTE: “I never accepted their killings and 
atrocities. I have condemned their killing and received death threats” 
(Joseph 2012). But some priests crossed the lines and joined the 
movement, most visible in the image of one priest close to LTTE leader 
Prabakharan who is reported to have been seen alongside him in the 
final hours of the war (Harrisson, 2013, 150). The credibility of priests to 
be respected as pastoral sovereigns required, however, that they were 
not seen to liaise too closely with the LTTE (see also: Goodhand et al., 
2009). 
The “sacred” aura of clergy’s pastoral bodies was based on the close 
relation between priests and their flock. As one priest formulated it: “The 
resilience of the Church is related to the endurance of a family: Families 
stay together and care for one another. The Church in Madhu endures 
the difficulties it faces, because leaders are with the people and give 
themselves to the community”.27 The priests’ firm embeddedness in the 
community gave credibility to the pastoral sovereignty that the priests 
carried with their bodies. As pastoral sovereigns, the priests have “two 
bodies” (Kantorowicz): the political bodies as pastoral sovereigns that 
protect them and their flock, and at the same time the natural body as 
individual human that made them vulnerable. Indeed, some priests have 
been killed: For example, Fr. Jim Brown disappeared on August 20, 
2006, after going into the navy controlled Allaipiddy area in Jaffna, 
when trying to negotiate with the navy to take injured people out of the 
fighting zone. Fr. Francis Joseph, disappeared in Mullaitivu on May 18, 
2009, when trying to broker a surrender of LTTE cadres to the army on 
the last day of war.28 
6. Pastoral sovereign: the ambiguity of charisma 
The charismatic Bishop Joseph of Mannar and his senior clergy 
embodied the aura of pastoral sovereignty very prominently, giving 
force and credibility to the claim to sole authority at Madhu sanctuary. 
Many interviewees referred to Bishop Joseph as the “voice of the peo-
ple”, and Joseph consistently employed emotive language such as “my 
people.” This aura as shepherd made Bishop Joseph “untouchable”. As 
one informant put it: “Because he stood with the people and had their 
support, no one was able to touch him”.29 Four elements combined to 
make him an authoritative figure. 
First, his leadership was exercised through a hierarchical and disci-
plined organization, with visual markers such as a fortress like Bishop’s 
house in Mannar and impressive Cathedrals and Churches. Loyalty to the 
17 B_Activist_100516.  
18 Bavinck (2011), p. 173: Diary entry April 1991.  
19 B_priest1_020707; B_Priest2_020707.  
20 D_priest2_Mannar_05122010, D_Bishop_Mannar_09122010, D_priest1_ 
Colombo_25012014, D_priest2_Mannar_27012014, D_priest1_Mannar_ 
28012014, D_nun1_28012014,D_nun1_Mannar_30012014, D_priest1_Mannar_ 
31012014.  
21 D_priest2_Mannar_27012014.  
22 D_Nun_Colombo_121210.  
23 D_teacher_Mannar_10122010, D_priest4/5_Mannar_29012014.  
24 D_Group Interview_Mannar_051210. 
25 B_priest2_ 280717.  
26 Some priests explained to us that they saw joining the priesthood as an 
alternative to joining the militants for politically conscious young men who 
wished to support the Tamil cause but did not agree with violent tactics. (cf. D_ 
priest_London_02042013, D_priest1_Mannar_28012014, D_priest1_Mannar_ 
29012014, D_priest2_Mannar_30012014, D_nun2_Mannar_30012014).  
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Bishop was fostered through a genuine love and respect for the man who 
took great personal risks to challenge the army and the LTTE about 
mistreatment of Tamil civilians. Although civilians widely voiced 
respect for Bishop Joseph’s decision to stay close to “his people”30 as a 
witness to and partner in their sufferings, Joseph’s autocratic leadership 
was at times also seen to be oppressive; “Many priests are scared of him 
and all decisions go through him”.31 
Secondly, the bishop and senior priests worked in a general context in 
which war gradually eroded local leadership, often specifically targeted 
by military groups (Fuglerud 2009; Gaasbeek 2010; Goodhand; Lewer, 
2000; Klem; Manuaguru, 2017; Korf 2004; Walker 2013). Community 
leaders left the area, or were silenced. Powerful politicians and gov-
ernment servants refused to challenge the status quo, and the security 
forces were seen as the perpetrators of Tamil suffering. Bishop Joseph 
and his senior priests stepped into the leadership vacuum. As one civil 
society representative put it: “The Bishop is authoritative because he 
goes in front and not behind”.32 A leading member of the Hindu temple 
in Mannar explained: “If the Bishop steps into a problem it will be 
solved. He is very strong, an autocratic leader.” 33 Bishop Joseph was the 
only religious leader strongly involved in politics, with even the Chief 
Ministers and Provincial Government meeting him for advice.34 
Thirdly, senior priests held powerful roles in local councils or com-
mittees, which gave them access to other senior actors within the gov-
ernment, military, international organisations and the LTTE. They 
worked with international aid workers and held relationships with 
military leaders (some of whom were Catholic). Bishop Joseph’s repu-
tation, authority and legitimacy positioned him as an important diplo-
matic figure. One international informant suggested Bishop Joseph had 
unparalleled access to LTTE leader Prabhakaran amongst religious 
leaders.35 The bishop was a member of the Catholic group (together with 
Cardinal Ranjith) that conducted shuttle diplomacy between the gov-
ernment and the LTTE, eventually negotiating the Norwegian inter-
vention during the late 1990s that would prepare the grounds for the 
ceasefire agreement (CFA) in 2002 (Goodhand et al., 2011). During the 
final months of battle in early 2009, together with other Tamil clergy, 
the bishop crossed the nearly impenetrable military frontlines to plead 
with LTTE leadership to concede defeat and avert humanitarian disaster. 
Though his message was not heeded, the bishop spoke without 
challenge.36 
Fourthly, the bishop was a powerful advocate for Tamil civilians, and 
outspoken voice calling the government to account for war crimes 
during the war and after its end. The Tamil Church initiated documen-
tation of those who went missing and drew on the experience and tes-
timony of clergy who stayed with civilians during the fighting. Bishop 
Joseph gave evidence critical of the government forces before the Les-
sons Learned and Reconciliation Commission,37 after which the Crim-
inal Investigation Department (CID) investigated him, and some 
Sinhalese nationalist activists and politicians repeatedly called for his 
arrest.38 When the Rajapakse regime tightened its surveillance and 
suppression of dissent under the state of emergency, the Bishop became 
one of few figures who spoke out against the government. A civil rights 
activist in Colombo explained: “He is the only person able to say these 
things”.39 
The charismatic leadership of Bishop Joseph illustrates the trans-
gression of pastoral power into the realms of sovereign power: his ges-
tures, habitus and practice of speaking about “my people” are 
constitutive of pastoral power: the shepherd who looks after the flock 
and takes great risk to rescue his sheep. Indeed, the bishop and senior 
clergy took great personal risks, endangered their physical safety and 
jeopardized their political reputation among Sinhalese politicians and 
military who questioned their loyalty to the state, and among LTTE 
cadres who envied their high regard among Tamils. The bishop fulfilled 
his tasks as shepherd with the authoritative aura of sovereign powers he 
held as the head of the diocese, and that he used to claim diplomatic 
exceptions, e.g. when travelling across the frontlines, appealing to the 
belligerents or defending human rights of Tamil civilians. While the two 
conflict parties and belligerents did not always listen to him, or called 
him a traitor, they never dared to “touch him”. As the bishop himself 
acknowledged: “I am alive because I am the Bishop. If not, I would have 
been part of Sri Lankan history” (Joseph 2012). 
7. Conclusion 
Why did the LTTE not kill the priests when the latter denied them 
entry to Madhu Church? The “miracle” of pastoral sovereignty is 
encapsulated in this encounter, when the LTTE’s all-encompassing, 
totalizing claim to be the sole ruler of the Tamil people (Thiranagama 
2011), which it otherwise ruthlessly defended by killing “traitors”, was 
face-to-face with the Church’s claim to sole authority on its sanctuary 
grounds. Given that the LTTE was heavily armed, while the Priests only 
had their human bodies as shields, the LTTE could have easily killed or 
injured the priests to get inside the Church. In this face-to-face 
encounter, the LTTE cadres did not dare to challenge the Church’s 
pastoral sovereignty, nor to touch the priests’ bodies. On the other side 
of the frontlines, the Bishop of Mannar confronted the Sinhalese military 
and the authoritarian Rajapakse regime with their human rights abuses, 
when many opposition figures disappeared in “white vans”; but nobody 
dared to “touch” the Bishop. 
This “untouchability” of priests, nuns and the bishop and the extra- 
territorial sanctuary that they defended reveal the “pastoral sover-
eignty” that the Church was claiming and performing in Sri Lanka’s war 
and post-war period. The performative effects of this pastoral sover-
eignty was rooted in the charismatic “aura” of religious leadership, the 
legitimacy afforded to priests as shepherds who shared the experience of 
suffering with their flock, the Tamil community, and the trans-local 
networks of the Church with powerful actors within the government, 
military and LTTE (often, but not only, with Catholics in these in-
stitutions), which the clergy could mobilize politically. The “intimate 
involvement”40 of priests and nuns with the plight of their parishes 
thereby provided the groundwork - the moral credibility - for the more 
political acts in the diplomatic channels or in the public arena that 
Bishop Joseph would fill with his charismatic personality. 
Humanitarian aid organisations that operate in zones of war depend 
to some extent on “the belligerents’ goodwill” (Fassin 2013, p. 42), who 
need to somewhat “respect” the formers’ extra-territorial (quasi-sover-
eign) claims to aid corridors or refugee camps. This was also the case for 
the Catholic Church as humanitarian organization. However, when 
sovereignty is heavily contested in ongoing war, ‘goodwill’ is not simply 
a gesture of “benevolence” (as Fassin writes), but emerges as a tacitly 
negotiated compromise of two parties whose agency is limited by the 
claims of the others, although these claims are articulated through 
different registers. Byung-Chul Han (2011, 76) writes that indiscrimi-
nate violence does not produce territory in the sense of spatial authority: 
brutal violence alone will not provide credible authority, which is 
30 D_International_London_11042013.  
31 D_NGO_Mannar_29012014.  
32 D_NGO_Mannar_27012014.  
33 D_LayHindu_Mannar_26012014.  
34 D_LayHindu_Mannar_26012014.  
35 D_priest1_Colombo_24012014.  
36 D_Bishop_Mannar_27012014.  
37 Submission by the Catholic Diocese of Mannar to the Lessons Learnt and 
Reconciliation Commission. 8th January 2011. https://www.jrs.net/assets/Re 
gions/IOR/media/files/LLRCsubmission_by_MannaarDiocese.pdf.  
38 D_priest3_Mannar_ 27012014. 39 D_NGO1_Colombo_24012014.  
40 D_nun_Mannar_28012014. 
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necessary to exert territorial control. This is the vulnerability of the 
belligerents’ performative power of sovereignty – a vulnerability that 
opens a space for humanitarian action. The Catholic clergy in Sri Lanka 
seem to have embodied this humanitarian space with a particular force. 
The Church stayed on where most humanitarian agencies left (interna-
tional staff in particular): this predicated the pastoral sovereignty of the 
Church that placed it apart from secular humanitarian agencies: these 
priests at the frontline were ready to sacrifice their lives for their sheep. 
Is pastoral sovereignty a radical political theology (Crockett, 2011)? 
Radical political theology understands its politics as a fundamental 
“disruption” (Rancière, 1995/1999) to the police order (here: the logic 
of sovereign power). Pastoral sovereignty’s logic of “interruption” (Metz 
1977, p. 150) makes space for humanitarian intervention, but does not 
confront the very logic of sovereign power itself. Kyle Gingerich Hiebert 
(2017, 50, 53) makes this point when he writes that Johann Baptist 
Metz’s new political theology, although showing the need to move 
beyond Carl Schmitt’s political theology, nevertheless acquiesces to the 
ongoing necessity of violence, and “lives out what it opposes” (Gingerich 
Herbert, 2017, 51). The work of interruption of the Catholic Church in 
Sri Lanka is implicated in the same predicament: its negotiated relations 
with the state that granted it exceptional privileges were one of the 
pillars that enabled the Church to act in quasi-sovereign manner in its 
humanitarian work, but a too radical disposition of the Church could 
have destroyed this pillar. The “interruption” that pastoral sovereignty 
performs is therefore by definition temporary and exceptional. Would it 
formulate a permanent claim over territory and its subjects or a radically 
different political project, it would transform into simply another 
competitor for secular sovereign power (and would need to replicate its 
law of violence). Then, it would not be pastoral sovereignty anymore. 
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